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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZA RUE WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THEO N. WOOD and 
RUTH L. WOOD, 
Defendan.ts a.nd Respon.dents. 
Case 
No. 8886 
APPELLANT.'S REP·LY BRIEF 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' PRELIMINARY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Since the respondents' preliminary statement of the 
case might lead to a misimpression, the appellant wishes 
to direct the Court's attention to the record at pages 101 
and 102, wherein it is indicated that the Trial Court 
directed a verdict in favor of the defendants upon the 
sole ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. The following is also 
found in the record at page 102: 
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MR. ALLEN: Will the Court also announce 
whether or not it considered the other grounds 
of the defendants' motion~ I believe they were 
well taken-the record will support them. 
THE COURT: The Court will rule no further 
than that it considers the evidence to show con-
tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
~IR. ALLE~: Thank you, your Honor. 
Respondents in their brief have indicated the desire 
to extend the scope of review to the issues of '' assump-
tion of risk of the appellant'' and also the presence or 
absence of duties o·wing to appellant. Appellant has no 
objection to this broadening of the scope of review so 
long as it is clearly understood that the Trial Court 
ruled, solely, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and no further, notwith-
standing the other grounds urged by respondents in 
support of their motion for a directed verdict in their 
favor. 
REPLY TO RESPONDEXTS' ST_\TE:JIEXT 
OF F~\CTS 
Referring to the position of the car belonging to 
appellant's husband immediately prior to the time the 
car lights were turned off, respondents' brief makes the 
statement that: 
''In such position, the headlights of the auto-
mobile would shine into and w-ould illuminate the 
garage through which appellant thereafter pro-
ceeded.'' 
(The middle of page 3) 
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The record states that the husband parked his car 
facing toward the pillar separating the two garage door-
ways (R. 45, Lines 13 through 15). Also, the left garage 
door was closed and a car was parked in the right half 
of the garage (Exhibit 1-P). No doubt the headlights 
of the car would illuminate the left-hand door and the 
rear of the automobile parked in the garage. However, 
and owing to the size of the automobile parked in the 
garage, there would be little chance for the headlights 
to "illuminate" the interior of the garage, and particu-
larly that portion which included the stairwell. See 
Exhibit 4-P. 
With reference to the record quoted in the respond-
ents' brief at pages 3, 4 and 5, it is to be observed that 
at no time did the appellant, in her testimony, admit any 
kind of knowledge of an unguarded stairwell. Further, 
the quan.tum and kind of knowledge which the appellant 
possessed as to the existence of a stairwell somewhere 
in the respondents' garage has been dealt with at length 
in appellant's previous brief at pages 4, 5, 6, 13, 14 and 
18. It is most important to note that such knowledge 
as the appellant had of the existence of amy kind of stair-
well in the garage, immediately prior to the time of the 
accident, was forgotten, owing to the appellant's over-
whelming mental preoccupation with the pending mar-
riage of her granddaughter. From the record at page 78, 
beginning at line 26, the respondent, Mrs. Wood, testi-
fied: 
"Thco asked her if she (appellant) didn't 
remember that the stairwell was there, and she 
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said Yes, but because she had been so upset over 
this wedding that she had temporarily forgotten.'' 
The statement is made in respondents' brief at page 
5 thereof that: 
"It is not rebutted in this record that neither 
of the respondents expected the appellant to use 
the garage to enter the home.'' ( T. 66, 78.) 
It is of interest to note in the record at page 74 (T. 
66) that respondent, ~Irs. Wood, testified that she 
assumed visitors to their home would choose whatever 
door they wished to enter the house. (The real issue, of 
course, is what a reasonable man might anticipate.) 
At the lower third of page 5 of the respondents' 
brief the statement is made that: 
"She (appellant) had two known alternate 
safe routes to travel into the home ... '' 
It should be noted, however, that the other two 
alternate routes consisted of following a path clear 
around the garage to the rear of the home and selecting 
a path to the front door of the darkened living room. 
Both alternate paths were dark since it was nighttime 
and the paths were unlighted. Rather than select either 
of these alternate dark paths, appellant choose the most 
direct route and the only route from which she sa-w any 
light at all. 
The first six lines on page 6 of respondents' brief 
nre fully rebutted by the middle paragraph on page 16 
of n ppellant 's prcYious brief. 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT 
OF POINTS 
POINT 1. THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANT-
ED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE LAW 
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT. 
A. The Appellant is Admitted to Have Been a Licensee 
on Respondents' Premises, But the Respondents Did 
Owe Duties of Care to Appellant and Did Breach 
These Duties, to Appellant's Damage. 
B. Appellant Had Some "Knowledge" That in Fact a 
Stairwell Existed in Respondents' Garage, But She 
Had No Knowledge That the Stairwell Was Un-
guarded and Was Not Provided With a Protective 
Railing Which She Was Told Would Be Installed 
Around the Stairwell. She is Not Therefore Charge-
able, as a Matter of Law, With Contributory N egli-
gence or Assumption of Risk. 
C. Appellant Proceeded Into a Darkened Area, But 
Toward the Light Which Emanated From the Rear 
Portion of Respondents' Home Where Respondents 
Indicated They Would Be, and Chose Not to Follow 
Either of Two Alternate Routes Which Were Totally 
Dark. She is Therefore Not to be Charged With 
Assumption of Risk or Contributory Negligence, as 
a ~latter of Law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANT-
ED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE ADMITTED FACTS AND THE LAW 
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT. 
A. The Appellant is Admitted to Have Been a Licensee 
on Respondents' Premises, But the Respondents Did 
Owe Duties of Care to Appellant and Did Breach 
These Duties, to Appellant's Damage. 
It is conceded that the appellant occupied the posi-
tion of guest-licensee on the premises of the respondents. 
The law given by respondents in their brief needs con-
siderable enlargement and qualification as regard the 
duties owed to a guest-licensee by host-licensors. 
A host's duties to a social guest (licensee) are as 
follows: 
(1) Not to injure, by active or affirmative negli-
gence, a guest whose presence is known. 
Sanders v. Bro1rn, 73 ~lriz. 116, 238 P. 2d 941, 
1lfcNamara v. Hall, 38 ·\rash. 2d 864, 233 P. 2d 852. 
(2) Not to set a trap or pitfaU for the gu-est. 
Gudwin v. Gudwin, 14 Conn. Supp. 147, 
Pa.ge v. J!m·phy, 194 l\Iinn. 607, 261 :N.\Y. 443, 
Roth 'l'. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 266 
App. Div. 872, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 592, 
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Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834, 
Pitt v. Jackson, (1939), 1 All Eng. 129. 
(3) To warn against or remove defects which the 
host knows are likely to coose harm to the guest and 
which he has reason to believe the guest is not likely to 
discover for himself. 
Sanders v. Brown, Supra, 
Loobe v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A. 2d 693 
(see especially), 
Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So. 2d 883 (see especially), 
Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581, 45 A. 2d 491, 
Faber v. Meiler, 278 App. Div. 849, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 
485, 
Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E. 2d 
453, 
Rushton v. Winters, 331 Pa. 78, 200 A. 60 (see 
especially), 
McNamara v. Hall, Supra. 
( 4) And generally not to cause injury by gross 
negligence (i.e., want of slight care), recklessness, or 
wanton and wilful misconduct. 
Sanders v. Brown, Supra, 
Barman v. Spencer, (Ind.), 49 N.E. 9 (see espec-
ially at p. 12, 2nd col.), 44 L.R.A. 815. 
See in the above regard, 25 A.L.R. 2d, 598-628. 
It is believed those duties above emphasized 1n 
italics are duties which the respondents owed to appel-
7 
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lants, and breached by the maintenance of their dan-
gerous stairwell. Appellant wishes to discuss each of 
these duties in order. 
( 1) Maintenance by Respondents of the Unguarded 
Stairwell Constituted a Trap or Pitfall. 
The doctrine of ''trap'' or ''pitfall'' has evolved to 
become something quite different than its original con-
cept. Prosser recites that: 
"While this phrase originally was used in the 
sense of presenting an appearance of safety where 
it did not exist, the significance which finally be-
came attached to it was not one of intent to injure 
or even of acti,~e conduct, but was merely that the 
possessor of land was under an obligation to dis-
close to the licensee any concealed dangerous con-
ditions of the premises of which he had knowl-
edge.'' 
Again: 
''The duty is not to maintain the land in safe 
condition, but to exercise reasonable care to see 
that warning is given.'' 
Prosser au Torts, 1941 Edition at pages 631 and 
632. 
It is to be noted that for a trap to exist, no intent 
to injure need be shown. 
Shypulski v. 1T'" a1dorf Paper Products Company, 
232 l\1:inn. 394, 45 N.\V. 2d 549. 
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As to traps the following is mentioned in the case 
of McHenry v. Howells, 201 Ore. 697, 272 P. 2d 210, at 
page 213: 
''As to plaintiff, defendants were subject to 
the rule of law that liability of an owner or occu-
pant of premises to a licensee may be predicated 
upon negligence in leaving something in the 
nature of a trap or pitfall at a place where his 
presence might have been anticipated, without a 
warning thereof. A trap within the meaning of 
this rule is a danger which a person who does not 
know the premises could not avoid by reasonable 
care and skill." (65 C.J.S., Negligence, paragraph 
38, page 503.) 
An example of a "trap" or "pitfall" is given 1n 
the case of Castro v. Sutter Creek Union High School 
District, 25 C.A. 2d 372, 77P. 2d 509 wherein the court 
held that a hole 3:Y2 feet in width and 2:Y2 feet deep dis-
posed between the sidewalk and curb of school property 
constituted a "trap" for which a young lady, falling 
into the same one night after a school dance and sus-
taining injuries therefrom, could recover. 
It is, of course, true that if, in the present case, the 
appellant had positive knowledge of the existence of an 
ungua.rded stairwell in respondents' garage, the doctrine 
of trap would not apply. However, the evidence clearly 
indicated that the appellant was assured by respondents 
some nine months prior to the accident that a protective 
railing was going to be installed around the stairwell. 
This was not done, but the respondent never informed 
appellant as to this fact. It would have been an easy 
9 
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/ 
thing for her daughter-in-law to have informed the 
appellant in their telephone conversation on the morning 
of the accident to be careful of the unguarded stairwell 
and to tell her that, as yet, the promised protective rail-
ing had not been installed. Such was not done. 
There is some testimony, though not without slight 
contradiction, that the respondent, Mrs. Wood, assumed 
that her mother-in-law would use the front door of 
respondents' home, on the evening in question. How-
ever, the test of reasonableness here must be applied 
and it is felt that a jury should determine whether or 
not a reasonable man could foresee that there was a 
possibility that appellant would proceed directly to the 
den of the residence where the family indicated they 
would be (taking the route through the open doorway 
of the garage which was the closest route she could have 
taken and in a direction where she saw light}, rather 
than choose alternate routes which were both longer to 
her point of destination and shrouded in the darkness 
of night. 
With regard to the doctrine of trap or pitfall the 
language of Tempest v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 
P. 2d 124, is of interest. In that case, heretofore referred 
to by both appellant and respondents, the accident hap-
pened on an interior stairway access to which was 
arhieved through a door. The Court noted: 
''It is general knowledge that a great many 
homes haYe rooms on different levels which are 
reached by stairways and to build a stairway with 
a door opening forward is not a trap or pitfall." 
10 
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With this statement of the Tempest case the appel-
lant agrees ; however, there is a vast difference between 
the stairway in that case and the unguarded pit which 
respondents caused to be built in their garage immedi-
ately adjacent the entrance thereto and next to the door 
of the den on the east side of the garage. Reference is 
now made to Exhibits 2-P and 4-P. In viewing these 
exhibits the appellant is certain the Court will be im-
pressed as to how the stairwell fits the description of a 
"pitfall", for not only is there an approximately eight 
foot drop-off immediately adjacent to the garage door-
way, but also the respondents constructed a "tripping" 
rise approximately four inches high (See Exhibit 2-P) 
so that, should one happen to stub his toe on this rise 
or rail, he or she would automatically plunge over the 
eight foot precipice. 
In brief, appellant feels that jury questions are 
presented relative to the doctrine of trap as to (1) 
whether or not the respondents as reasonable people 
ought to have suspicioned that, conceivably, their mother 
might take a direct route through an open doorway of 
the garage to the lighted den and (2) whether in fact 
the appellant lacked sufficient knowledge so as to be 
chargeable with actual or constructive knowledge of an 
open unguarded stairwell, particularly where the testi-
mony indicated that she had subjectively forgotten even 
of the existence of a stairwell immediately prior to her 
entrance into the garage. As to the forgetfulness aspect, 
reference is now made to the appellant's previous brief 
at pages 18-22 and the cases therein cited. 
11 
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( 2) The Respondents Owed a Duty to the Appellant to 
Warn Against or Remove Defect Which the Host 
Knows is Likely to Cause Harm to the Guest and 
Which He Has Reason to Believe the Guest is Not 
Likely to Discover for Himself. 
The reasoning and cases cited with reference to the 
doctrine of trap it is believed apply also to this duty. 
The reason why the textwriters seem to list two separate 
duties is that in some instances in a small minority of 
jurisdictions the old strict doctrine of trap (including 
malicious intent) is still applied. Where the liberal 
Prosser view and the majority rule is used with refer-
ence to the trap doctrine then the doctrine of trap would 
appear almost to merge with this second duty enumer-
ated. In appellant's opinion, one is certainly awed at 
looking at Exhibits 2-P and 5-P that the danger appar-
ent in maintaining such an unguarded pit into which 
one might easily fall. Further, at night time the pit 
would be difficult to obserYe from the exterior since car 
lights shining on the front of the garage would strike 
that portion of the garage which conceals the stairwell. 
( 3) Respondents Were Grossly X egligent as to Appel-
lant. 
The maintenance by the respondents of the stairwell-
pit in the garage on their premises, while perhaps not 
amounting to wilful and wanton misconduct, certainly 
bespeaks gross negligence. 
12 
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It is generally accepted that gross negligence is dis-
tinguished from mere negligence in aggrevation or de-
gree, and is equivalent to "want of slight care." 
Prosser on Torts, Supra, p. 259, 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Mc-
Coy, 81 Ky. 403, 5 Ky. L.R. 397, 
Peavy v. Pea.vy, 36 Ga. App. 202 at 204, 136 S.E. 
96 (see especially). 
Thus, if a host-licensor allowed a small rut to exist 
in an anticipated pathway which the guest-licensee might 
use, it is believed that this would be an act of simple 
negligence for which the host-licensor would not be 
liable. But there is a vast difference in degree between 
a small rut in a roadway or walkway and an eight foot 
cement pit which the respondents maintained at the 
front of their garage immediately adjacent to a door 
leading to the living quarters of the residence. Refer-
ence again is made to Exhibit 2-P. Certainly a business 
invitee would be permitted to recover at law against his 
business host if the host were to permit the existence 
of a rut into the established place of business. The 
maintenance of the rut would be an act of simple negli-
gence. But the maintenance of the stairwell on the res-
pondents' premises is believed to be much more shock-
ing to the conscience of those who expect at least some 
minimum of care in the maintenance of premises so 
that members of the family or those in their shoes will 
not suffer injury. In the present case the appellant was 
a member of the respondents' family, being the mother 
of one of the respondents, and being such is entitled to 
13 
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some type of warning that the respondents had failed 
to surround the extremely dangerous stairwell with a 
protective enclosure, as promised, or at least to be 
apprised of this gross danger. 
B. Appellant Had Some "Knowledge" That in Fact a 
Stairwell Existed in Respondents' Garage, But She 
Had No Knowledge That the Stairwell Was Un-
guarded and Was Not Provided With a Protective 
Railing Which She Was Told Would Be Installed 
Around the Stairwell. She is Not Therefore Charge-
able, as a Matter of Law, With Contributory Negli· 
gence or Assumption of Risk. 
Not wishing to multiply words, appellant answers 
respondents' argument by merely referring again to 
pages 12, 13, 14 and 18 of the appellant's previous brief. 
By virtue of previous argument given it will be readily 
seen that the import of the record cited at page 11 of 
respondents' brief must be seriously qualified and dis-
counted in view of her past experience and in view of 
the fact that she had, by respondents' testimony, for· 
gotten of the stairwell at the time of the accident. 
As to assumption of risk appellant agrees that the 
law given in this section of respondents' brief is the 
law to be applied. HoweYer, and referring to sub-section 
e of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 340 
(See page 12 in respondents' brief), it will be noted tha.t 
there was clearly no assumption of risk by the appellant 
since she didn't ''know'' of the true condition of the 
premises, by Yirtue of the fact that she was previously 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
advised a protective railing was to be installed around 
the stairwell, and she was not thereafter informed that 
such had in fact not been done. Afortiori, one cannot 
assume a risk of which he lacks knowledge. 
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is the 
necessity for inquiring into the appellant's state of mind 
as to the appellant's ''awareness of the situation and his 
realization of the risks to which he exposes himself." 
See comment a of Section 893, Restatement of the Law 
of Torts. To be guilty of assumption of risk, the appel-
lant must have had a reasonably accurate apprehension 
of the risk she was assuming. In the present case, at the 
time of the accident the plaintiff had forgotten about the 
existence and location of the stairwell (see the record at 
page 70, lines 26 through 29). There can be no assump-
tion of risk of a danger one has forgotten. Further, the 
plaintiff was informed by her own daughter-in-law that 
an iron railing would be placed around the dangerous 
stairwell. See the record at page 75, line 30 through 
page 76, line 10. Immediately prior to the accident the 
appellant did not know of the presence or absence of 
the promised iron railing. Lack of information on this 
point on the part of the appellant could not possibly 
render her guilty of assumption of risk since she did not 
possess an awareness that risk was even involved. 
C. Appellant Proceeded into a Darkened Area, But 
Toward the Light Which Emanated From the Rear 
Portion of Respondents' Home Where Respondents 
Indicated They Would Be, and Chose Not to Follow 
Either of Two Alternate Routes Which Were Totally 
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Dark. She is Therefore Not to Be Charged With 
Assumption of Risk or Contributory Negligence, as 
a Matter of Law. 
As to respondents' parenthetical remark at pages 
13 and 14, it is deemed sufficient to answer that there is 
no evidence whatever that, were the lights even to be 
left on, the stairwell would have been illuminated. Fur-
thermore, appellant's husband not the appellant was in 
charge of the automobile and its light controls, and she 
could not possibly be charged with her husband's negli-
gence, even if he were negligent. 
There is no evidence whatever that the two alter-
nate routes available to the appellant, the route leading 
around to the back of the house and the route to the 
front door, were safe. In fact, both routes were totally 
dark since it was nighttime and the appellant, rather 
than choose either of these two dark routes, chose to 
follow the light which she saw emanating from the den 
and thus proceeded to the den in the most direct route 
available. The comment cannot be resisted that if res-
pondents were content to have constructed and to main-
tain an unguarded eight foot preripire at the entrance 
of their garage at the open doorway thereof and next to 
a door leading into the liYing quarters of the residence, 
what might they not do on the grounds exterior of the 
home? 
At page 15 of respondents' brief, opposing counsel 
urges the applicability of the following automobile rases 
to ihe present stainn'll rase and ritc•s in support of his 
contentions the following: 
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Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 P. 
304; 
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80 
Utah 331, 15 P. 2d 309; 
Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366. 
The Dalley case lays down the ''Assured Clear Dis-
tance Rule" for the State of Utah. In the Nikoleropoulos 
case the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck down by the 
defendants' automobile traveling in the same direction 
as the plaintiff on State Street in Salt Lake City, a street 
at that time traveled by both vehicles and pedestrians. 
In the Dalley case the defendants had left a truck 
parked, without lights, on the traveled portion of the 
Zion Park Highway. In the Hansen case the defendants 
had constructed a barricade to prevent highway traffic 
from turning off onto a newly constructed highway which 
had not been completed. In all three cases the danger 
"\Vas foreseeable, to-wit, the traveling pedestrian, a 
parked truck and a barricade, all normally associated 
with streets, highways and travel thereon. Even in the 
case of Tempest v. Richardson, the Court pointed out 
with respect to foreseeability that "it is general knowl-
edge that a great many homes have rooms on different 
levels which are reached by stairways ... " Thus, as it 
is with primary negligence, so it is with contributory 
negligence: In order to be operative, the risk to the 
plaintiff must be foreseeable to her and the result must 
come within the risk created. 
Neglect for the moment any effect that any past 
experience the appellant has had with the respondents' 
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garage and stauwell. On entering a darkened garage 
she can only be charged with constructive knowledge 
that she might trip over objects lying on the garage 
floor, or else bump into objects standing thereon. (This 
is exactly like the automobile cases above quoted wherein 
the law charged foreseeability on the part of the plain-
tiff to natural objects on highways, to-wit, pedestrians, 
parked trucks and barricades.) In the present case, in 
the absence of definite knowledge on the part of the 
appellant as to the presence and location of the stair-
well, the law does not construct foreseeability on the 
part of the appellant relative to pitfalls or darkened 
stairwells. The appellant, by her act of entering the 
darkened garage, did not unreasonably assume the risk 
of an unprotected stairwell. 
ANSWER TO ARGU~IENT OF RESPONDENTS 
The respondents' discounting of the importance of 
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, et al., 69 S. Ct. 413, 336 U.S. 
53, 93 L. Ed. 497, cited at page 10 of appellant's previous 
brief and page 16 of respondents' brief, is deemed fully 
answered by the cases in comment given on page 10 of 
appellant's previous brief. 
Respondents recite that Deacy r. JlcDonnell, 131 
Conn. 101, 38 A. 2d 181, presents a "questionable rule" 
of law. Interestingly enough, the Deacy case appears 
to be the weight of authority. See the numerous cases 
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Respondents also make note on page 17 of their 
brief that the Deacy case was presented and argued to 
this Court in the recent case of Tempest v. Richardson. 
This is true ; however, the Deacy case was argued on 
pages 16 and 17 of respondents' brief in the Tempest 
case only on the question of duty of the host-licensor to 
guest-licensee and not on the issue of the effect of for-
getfulness on the issue of contributory negligence (on 
which point it was presented on pages 18 through 20 of 
appellant's previous brief). On the operative effect of 
forgetfulness, the respondents' brief is silent; compare 
with appellant's brief, pp. 18-22. 
CONCLUSION 
Questions of negligence, contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, and primary duty which reasonable 
men might decide differently in applying the ''reason-
able man standard'' to the facts of the case are questions 
of ultimate fact which- certainly in the present case -
fall within the province of the jury to decide. 
CORRECTION 
Kindly substitute "recovery" for "respectfully" 
in the second from last line on p. 24 of appellant's pre-
vious brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOTT W. EVANS 
M. RALPH SHAFFER 
for EVANS & NESLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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